管理层激励对企业研发效率的影响研究——来自中国工业上市公司的经验证据  被引量:74

The Influence of Managerial Incentives on Firm R&D Efficiency:Evidences from Industrial Listed Companies in China

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作  者:梁彤缨[1] 雷鹏[1] 陈修德[2] 

机构地区:[1]华南理工大学工商管理学院,广州510640 [2]广东工业大学管理学院,广州510520

出  处:《管理评论》2015年第5期145-156,共12页Management Review

基  金:教育部人文社科研究规划基金项目(11YJA630053);广东省哲学社会科学"十二五"规划项目(GD13YGL01);广东省教育厅建设专项资金资助项目(2013WYM_0014);中国博士后科学基金项目(2013M531827)

摘  要:基于2009-2012年中国工业上市公司的样本数据,运用随机前沿模型实证检验了管理层激励对企业研发效率的影响。研究发现:股权激励与企业研发效率之间呈显著的倒U型关系,货币薪酬激励对企业研发效率具有显著的负面效应。进一步研究表明:(1)股权激励与研发效率之间的倒U型关系并未受到所有制性质的显著影响,相对的,薪酬激励对企业研发效率的负面影响在国有控股企业中表现得尤为突出;(2)无论是股权激励还是薪酬激励,其与企业研发效率的关系均会因企业所在行业特征的不同而表现出显著的差异;(3)股权激励对企业研发效率的影响未受到区域市场化程度的制约,而位于市场化程度较高区域的企业,其薪酬激励对企业研发效率的负面影响要强于市场化程度较低区域的企业。Based on the data during 2009-2012 of industrial listed companies in China,this paper uses stochastic frontier model to analyze the influence of managerial incentives on firm R&D efficiency,and finds that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between equity incentive and firm R&D efficiency,and the compensation incentive has significant negative effect on firm R&D efficiency. Further studies show that:( 1) the ownership has no significant effect on the inverted U-shaped relationship between equity incentive and R&D efficiency,but the compensation incentive has a greater negative effect on R&D efficiency in state-owned firms;( 2) the industry characteristic has significant effect both on the inverted U-shaped relationship between equity incentive and R&D efficiency and on the negative relationship between compensation incentive and R&D efficiency;( 3) the marketization has no significant effect on the relationship between equity incentive and R&D efficiency,but it exacerbates the negative relationship between compensation incentive and R&D efficiency.

关 键 词:股权激励 薪酬激励 企业研发效率 随机前沿分析 

分 类 号:F425[经济管理—产业经济] F273.1F272.92

 

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