寡头竞争情形下的国企改革——论国有股份比重的最优选择  

China's SOE Reform under Oligopolistic Market Structure:Implications for Optimal Choice of State-owned Stock Ratio

作　　者：孙群燕[1] 李杰[1] 张安民 

机构地区：[1]中山大学岭南学院,510275 [2]University of British Columbia

出　　处：《经济研究》2004年第1期64-73,共10页Economic Research Journal

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助 (批准号 :10 1310 30 );世川基金博士生创新项目资助

摘　　要：本文通过构建一个混合寡头垄断竞争的博弈模型 ,分别就封闭经济和开放经济的情形 ,探讨国企在背负一定的社会性负担的条件下 ,国企内部国有股份比重的变化如何影响整个社会的福利以及政府的支付。我们的基本结论是 :在国企相对生产效率很低的情况下 ,必须对其进行私有化改革 ;但是 ,如果国企的相对生产效率不太低 ,完全的私有化并不能最大化社会总体福利或政府支付。我们的基本结论可为政府当前国企改革的政策思路提供一定的理论支持。This paper examines the effect of the change of state-owned stock ratio (SOSR) in an SOE on the efficiency of the whole society and the payoff of the government. We address this issue by setting up a mixed oligopolistic competition model and divide the analysis into two cases: Closed Economy and Open Economy. Our basic results are as follows: if the relative production efficiency of an SOE is too low, complete state ownership is not optimal, and privatization will be a necessary step; However, if the relative production efficiency of an SOE is not too low, complete privatization is not optimal for the government or from the social perspective. Our results can to a certain extent provide a theoretical support for the government's idea on the SOE reform.

关 键 词：寡头竞争 国有企业 改革 中国 国有股份 边际替代效应 公司治理结构 社会负担 

分 类 号：F276.1[经济管理—企业管理]