管理层风险报酬的有效性分析  

The Analysis of the Validation of Manager's Risk Return

作　　者：魏明海[1] 卢锐[1] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学管理学院,广东广州510275

出　　处：《当代财经》2004年第3期98-101,共4页Contemporary Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70172023);教育部"十五"人文社科规划项目(01JA630019)

摘　　要：本文结合我国制度背景,分析不同控股股东类型下的上市公司管理层风险及其风险报酬的特征,并初步检验了管理层报酬计划的有效性。研究表明:不同控股股东类型下的管理层报酬和持股比例是有差异的;大多数控股类型的上市公司管理层报酬一定程度上与净利润或股价相关,但政府部门和外资企业控股的上市公司管理层报酬计划并未显现其激励性;相对于股价而言,上市公司管理层报酬更多地与净利润相关。This article combined our countries' system background, analyzed different manager's risk return and the characters of the risk return under different types of holding stockholders, and tested the validation of manager's return plan. The study showed that there had different manager's return and holding rates among different types of holding stockholders; the manager's return of holding type listing company always had relationship with the pure profit and stock price, but the manager's return plan of government's and foreign capital holding listing companies' had not show the encouragement; cooperated to stock price, listing companies' manager's return had more relationship with the pure profit.

关 键 词：控股股东 管理层风险报酬 有效性 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]