诉讼证明理论中的四组相对概念之辨正  

Differentiation and Correction of Four Groups of Opposite Concepts in Proof Theory

作　　者：宋振武[1] 

机构地区：[1]烟台大学法学院,山东烟台264005

出　　处：《法学论坛》2004年第2期86-91,共6页Legal Forum

摘　　要：法律事实是个既有歧义又不必要的概念。客观真实说作为关于证明标准的观点和关于证明评价标准的观点都是不成立的,不具有现实的程序意义,法律真实则是多余并且不成立的伪概念。诉讼证明中的所谓绝对真实与相对真实与认识论意义上的绝对真理与相对真理不可相提并论。对形式真实与实质真实应作为关于真实的发现的相对的程序原则来理解,形式真实主义的实质是承认当事人自身意志的有效性,实质真实主义的实质是不承认当事人自身意志的有效性。The legal fact is an unnecessary concept with different meanings together. The theory of objective truth is not tenable, neither as the view on the proof standard nor as the view on the standard valuing the proof,and has no reality in procedure. The concept of legal truth is unnecessary and false. The absolute truth and relative truth called in the proof in litigation are not equal to the absolute truth and relative truth in epistemology. The formal truth and substantial truth should be regarded as the opposite procedural principals on the discovery of truth, the substance of the principal of formal truth is to admit the validity of the will of the parties, and the substance of the principal of substantial truth is not to admit the validity of the will of the parties.

关 键 词：客观事实与法律事实 客观真实与法律真实 绝对真实与相对真实 实质真实与相对真实 

分 类 号：D915[政治法律—诉讼法学]