电子政务发展过程中政府与公务员的博弈分析  

Game Analysis between Government and Office-Bearer in e-Government Development

作　　者：王晓华[1] 王浣尘[1] 王晓华 王浣尘[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰管理学院，上海200052

出　　处：《上海交通大学学报》2004年第3期385-388,共4页Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University

摘　　要：从经济学的角度分析了我国从传统政务向电子政务变迁过程中公务员的利益冲突和行为特点,井指出要顺利推行电子政务,必须设计有效的公务员激励机制.对此,建立了相应的博弈模型,分析了在信息对称、政府提供固定奖励以及信息不对称条件下政府对公务员的激励机制.From the viewpoint of economics, this paper analysed the benefit and behavior of office-bearer in the transition process from traditional government to e-government in China. The effective incentive mechanism for office-bearer should be designed in order to promote the e-government development. The game model for the problem was founded. The incentive mechanism under information symmetry, the fixed encouragement provided by government and information asymmetry was analyzed.

关 键 词：政府 公务员 电子政务 激励机制 

分 类 号：C931[经济管理—管理学]