R&D补贴与社会次佳R&D  

R&D Subsidies and Socially SecondBest R&D

作　　者：霍沛军[1] 陈继祥[2] 陈剑[1] 

机构地区：[1]清华大学经济管理学院,北京100084 [2]上海交通大学工商管理系,上海200052

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2004年第2期1-3,共3页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：清化大学-中大集团博士后科学基金项目(2002);国家自然科学基金项目(70071016);中国博士后科学基金项目(中博基(2002)17号)

摘　　要：本文考虑一个带有R＆D溢出的双寡头模型,其中每个企业先后确定自己的R＆D支出和产量。假定双寡头在产量上不合作,文中首先给出了使社会福利最大的R＆D水平即社会次佳R＆D,随后分别就双寡头在R＆D上不合作与合作两种情况,给出了政府为取得最大社会福利而对R＆D进行补贴的效应。研究表明,政府通过补贴可以使R＆D水平和福利达到社会次佳。This paper considers a duopoly model with R&D spillovers, where each firm determines its R&D expenditure and output successively. Assuming that the duopoly do not cooperate in output,the paper first derives the R&D level that maximize the social welfare.Such an R&D level is denoted as socially secondbest R&D. Then, this paper gives the effects of R&D subsidy by the government with the object to obtain maximal social welfare under the two cases that the duopoly do and do not cooperate in R&D. It is shown that the R&D level and welfare can achieve socially secondbest through the governments subsidies.

关 键 词：研究与发展 补贴 溢出 合作 Coumot均衡 NASH均衡 

分 类 号：F016[经济管理—政治经济学]