代理问题、公司治理与企业价值——以民营上市公司为例  

Agency Problem, Corporate Governance and Firm Value: Evidence from Chinese Listed Private-controlled Companies

作　　者：苏启林[1] 

机构地区：[1]暨南大学管理学院,广东广州510630

出　　处：《中国工业经济》2004年第4期100-106,共7页China Industrial Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"东南沿海家族企业发展战略研究"(批准号70173045)

摘　　要：本文运用代理理论对2002年在上海、深圳证券交易所上市的122家民营上市公司治理与企业价值进行理论分析与实证检验,发现民营上市公司治理包括在股权集中度、债务融资比重、金字塔式控股、控制权与现金流权偏离、流通股与非流通股价偏离等五个方向上存在着代理冲突,并指出引发民营上市公司代理冲突的首要原因是现行流通股与非流通股的股权割裂。Based on the agency theory, the paper analyzes and verifies the corporate governance and firm value of 122 private-controlled companies listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 2002 and leads to the discovery that in these listed private companies five kinds of agency conflicts are merging: ownership concentration, debt finance ratio, stock pyramids, departure of control and cash rights, and price warp of current and non-current stocks. It is concluded in the paper that the dissevering of stockholder into current and no-current segments is the upmost cause for the agency conflicts.

关 键 词：委托-代理关系 公司治理结构 企业价值 民营上市公司 中国 证券市场 股权割裂 股权集中度 债务融资 现金流权 股票价格 

分 类 号：F279.246[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济]