咨询服务虚拟企业的动态契约设计  

Dynamic Bargain Design for Virtual Enterprise Dealing in Consulting Service

作　　者：卢纪华[1] 潘德惠[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院,辽宁沈阳110004

出　　处：《东北大学学报（自然科学版）》2004年第5期501-504,共4页Journal of Northeastern University(Natural Science)

基　　金：国家"十五"科技攻关计划项目(2001BA206A)

摘　　要：研究基于咨询项目的虚拟企业利益分配问题·运用委托-代理理论并引入固定成本和保留效用假设,提出了逆向选择下的两种两阶段动态契约,即完全相关信息结构、独立信息结构的动态契约模式,揭示盟主根据高效或低效合作伙伴在不同阶段拥有私人信息的相关程度,通过设计不同的动态契约机制来增强合作伙伴的参与意识和工作努力程度,实现资源的高效配置·旨在解决咨询服务虚拟企业中拥有私人信息下的工作努力与利益分配问题,为咨询服务虚拟企业中分期付款问题提供一定的理论依据·The profit sharing of a virtual enterprise is studied on consultation service basis. Based on the principal-agent theory and the assumption of fixed cost and utility retention, two kinds of 2-phases dynamic bargain models as inverse options are proposed, i.e., completely correlated information structure and independent information structure. Thus, the alliance leader has to design different mechanisms of dynamic bargains to enable every alliance member to participate actively in the alliance and work harder for it for implementing the high-efficiency resource allocation, according to the correlativity of individual information actually offered by high-efficiency and low-efficiency alliance member in different phases. The study is done with the intention of solving the profit sharing problem in a virtual enterprise dealing in consulting service in accordance to how a member worked and what and how much information a member offered. It also provides a theoretical base to a certain degree to solve the problem of installment payment of such virtual enterprises.

关 键 词：咨询服务 动态契约 逆向选择 虚拟企业 利益分配 分期付款 委托-代理 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]