具溢出效应的有限理性双寡头博弈的动态演化  

Dynamics of duopoly model with bounded rationality and spillover effect

作　　者：易余胤[1] 盛昭瀚[1] 肖条军[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学工程管理学院,江苏南京210093

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2004年第3期244-250,共7页Journal of Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70171028);国家自然科学基金资助项目(70301014).

摘　　要：研究一个具溢出效应的有限理性双寡头重复博弈模型.试图从演化的观点来分析,当有限理性双寡头进行博弈时,产量在动态调整过程中是怎样达到均衡的.指出寡头的理性决定着寡头重复博弈是否能达到Nash均衡.溢出效应将增加博弈达到Nash均衡的可能性.文章用数字模拟的方法观测到了这一现象,并对混沌现象的出现及其对市场、企业的影响做了有益的探索.A Cournot model with bounded rationality and spillover effect are studied. We try to analyze how the output to reach an equilibrium during the dynamic adjustment of duopoly game from the evolutionary view. We show that the rationality of duopoly determines whether or not the game can reach Nash equilibrium. And we also show that the firm with spillover effect has a higher chance of reaching Nash equilibrium. And this phenomenon is observed by numerical simulation. We also study the influence of chaos on market and enterprise, and gain some interesting results.

关 键 词：有限理性 成本外部性 溢出效应 NASH均衡 

分 类 号：F713[经济管理—产业经济]