企业并购定价的博弈分析  

Game-Theoretic Analysis of Acquisition and Merger Pricing Between Companies

作　　者：王义秋[1] 王琳[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院,辽宁沈阳110004

出　　处：《东北工学院学报》2004年第6期586-589,共4页

基　　金：辽宁省科技厅软科学资助项目(2002401107)

摘　　要：从完全但不完美信息博弈的角度,对企业并购过程中目标企业出高价和出低价与主并企业买与不买的决策进行了博弈分析,得出了并购双方各自在不同情况下的最优选择·对目标企业而言,当目标企业经营状况好并且清楚主并企业的先验概率时,目标企业的最优选择是以高价出售;当目标企业经营状况差并且清楚知道主并企业的先验概率时,目标企业的最优选择是以低价出售·对主并企业而言,当目标企业出低价时,主并企业以ω1的概率选择并购目标企业;当目标企业出高价时,主并企业以ω2的概率选择并购目标企业·对企业并购的定价进行博弈分析,旨在避免无效率并购,促进企业的发展,有效地实现并购重组优化资源配置的功能·The issue how to make decision by a company that intends to merge/acquire another one or, to the contrary, to be merged/acquired by another one is discussed game-theoretically with respect to pricing policy from the angle of complete but imperfect information, thus giving an optimal choice to either party. For the target company, its best policy is to take advantage of a low sailling price when it dont succeed in operation and vice versa, if it has known clearly the prior probability of the company intending to merge it. For the company intending to merge a target one, it had best select a target one with the probability ω_1, if the target one is offering low price, or select a target one with the probability ω_2 if the target one is offering high price. Such a game-theoretic analysis of pricing is aiming at avoiding ineffective merger and acquisition to foster the growth of each party so as to implement effectively the restructuring and optimization of resource allocation.

关 键 词：企业 并购 定价 博弈分析 协同效应 信息不对称 关联交易 核心竞争力 先验概率 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理] F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]