定义在非闭集上的二人零和连续凸对策  

Zero-sum continuous convex games defined in a non-close set

作　　者：阎慧臻[1] 于华[1] 

机构地区：[1]大连轻工业学院数理系,辽宁大连116034

出　　处：《大连轻工业学院学报》2004年第1期66-68,共3页Journal of Dalian Institute of Light Industry

摘　　要：在二人零和对策中,为了确保对策的值及最优策略的存在性,局中人纯策略集为闭集是一个至关重要的条件。本文讨论了一类定义在非闭集[a,b]×[c,d)或[a,b)×[c,d]上的二人零和连续对策,其最优策略的存在性问题。着重研究其赢得函数为凸(或凹)函数时,最优纯策略的存在性。In the zero-sum two person game, closeness of the set for pure strategies of the players is an important condition to guarantee the existence of the value and optimal strategies for the game.In this paper, the existence of optimal strategies in zero-sum continuous two person game with non-close set [a,b]×[c,d)[a.b)×[c,d] is investigated.Especially, the existence of optimal pure strategies with concave(or convex) payoff functions for this kind of game is discussed. 

关 键 词：非闭集 支付函数 最优策略 二人零和对策 凸函数 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]