安全投资和保费分析下的网络保险激励策略  

Network Insurance Incentive Strategies Based on Analysis of Security Investment and Premium

作　　者：史一涵 袁燕尔 张青菁 

机构地区：[1]杭州师范大学,浙江 杭州

出　　处：《应用数学进展》2021年第7期2553-2560,共8页Advances in Applied Mathematics

摘　　要：随着信息技术的大量应用,企业信息系统常常会面临不同种类的网络安全风险问题,对此,本文就巨型公司补贴供应商网络保费问题进行研究,并设计解决方案。通过构建安全投资激励下的供应商投资保险模型与保费激励下的巨型公司投资保险模型,本文考虑供应商脆弱性水平,公司受攻击性水平等因素对于期望效用的相关性影响,分析所需的最优保费补贴情况,并提出合理的网络保险激励策略,进而改善企业自身安全防御水平,提高公司效益。With the large-scale application of information technology, enterprise information systems often face different types of network security risks. In this regard, this article studies the problem of giant companies subsidizing supplier network premiums and designs solutions. By constructing a supplier investment insurance model under security investment incentives and a giant company investment insurance model under premium incentives, we consider the supplier’s vulnerability level, the company’s level of aggressiveness and other factors that affect the expected utility. At the same time, we analyze the required optimal premium subsidies, and put forward reasonable network insurance incentive strategies so as to improve the company’s own security defense level and efficiency.

关 键 词：期望效用函数 数值仿真法 网络保险激励 

分 类 号：F27[经济管理—企业管理]