管理者超额薪酬、企业未来业绩与绿色创新  

Excess Compensation of Managers, Future Performance of Enterprises and Green Innovation

作　　者：章雷松 

机构地区：[1]上海工程技术大学管理学院,上海

出　　处：《应用数学进展》2022年第6期3309-3317,共9页Advances in Applied Mathematics

摘　　要：本文以2007~2019年沪深A股上市公司为初始样本,基于薪酬激励理论、薪酬契约理论和创新理论,实证检验了管理者超额薪酬对绿色创新的影响,并对企业未来业绩的中介作用进行了验证。结果表明:管理者超额薪酬能显著正向促进绿色创新,这种作用在非国有企业中更加明显;管理者超额薪酬能显著正向促进企业未来业绩;企业未来业绩在管理者超额薪酬和绿色创新之间存在部分中介作用。文章对完善薪酬激励体系,保证企业未来业绩和发展绿色创新战略提出了相关建议。This paper takes the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2019 as the initial sample, based on the compensation incentive theory, compensation contract theory and in-novation theory, empirically tests the impact of managerial excess compensation on green innova-tion, and the intermediary effect of corporate future performance was verified. The results show that: the excess compensation of managers can significantly and positively promote green innova-tion, and this effect is more obvious in non-state-owned enterprises;the excess compensation of managers can significantly and positively promote the future performance of enterprises;the fu-ture performance of enterprises is in the relationship between excess compensation of managers and green innovation. There is a partial intermediary effect between them. The article puts forward relevant suggestions for improving the salary incentive system, ensuring the future performance of the enterprise and developing the green innovation strategy.

关 键 词：管理者超额薪酬 企业未来业绩 绿色创新 中介效应 

分 类 号：F272.91[经济管理—企业管理]