非国有股东董事会权力能抑制真实盈余管理行为吗?  

Can Non-State Shareholders’ Board Power Curb Real Earning Management Practices?

作　　者：陆峥翔 

机构地区：[1]上海工程技术大学,管理学院,上海

出　　处：《应用数学进展》2022年第8期5380-5388,共9页Advances in Applied Mathematics

摘　　要：本文以A股上市国有企业2013~2020年为研究样本,研究非国有股东董事会权力对真实盈余管理的抑制作用。实证研究结果表明:当非国有股东获得董事会权力后,能够显著抑制真实盈余管理程度;并且,监督治理和信息传递是非国有股东董事会权力抑制企业真实盈余管理的影响路径。具体地说,非国有股东委派董事会加强其对管理层的监督与约束,进而抑制企业的真实盈余管理行为;随着非国有股东共享优质信息资源,非国有股东委派的董事对企业真实盈余管理的抑制作用越显著。这一研究结论有助于深化国企混合所有制改革,同时为完善高层治理结构提供了经验数据。This paper examines the inhibitory effect of non-state shareholders’ board power on real earning management, using a sample of A-share listed state-owned enterprises in China from 2013~2020. The findings show that non-state shareholders’ board power inhibits firms’ real earning manage-ment, where supervisory governance and information transmission are the influential paths. In de-tail, non-state shareholder appointed board strengthens its supervision and restraint on manage-ment, which in turn inhibits firms’ real earning management behavior;the more non-state share-holders share quality information resources, the more significant non-state shareholder- appointed directors effect on firms’ real earning management. The findings of this study can make contribu-tions for how firms could deepen the mixed ownership reform and improve the quality of their earnings through empirical data provided.

关 键 词：混合所有制改革 真实盈余管理 董事会权力 影响路径 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]