基于间接互惠的三策略囚徒困境演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Three Strategies Prisoner’s Dilemma Based on Indirect Reciprocity

作　　者：王新颖 

机构地区：[1]辽宁师范大学数学学院,辽宁 大连

出　　处：《应用数学进展》2024年第2期584-588,共5页Advances in Applied Mathematics

摘　　要：本文首先将间接互惠中的辨别者策略(DIS)加入到经典囚徒困境博弈中,得到三策略的囚徒困境博弈模型。然后利用复制动态方程及雅可比矩阵的稳定性分析,探究博弈模型各个均衡点的稳定性。最后得到结论:均衡点(0,0,1)和均衡点(1,0,0)是渐进稳定的,进而解决了囚徒博弈困境。This article first incorporates the discriminator strategy (DIS) in indirect reciprocity into the classic prisoner’s dilemma game and obtains a prisoner’s dilemma game model with three strategies;then, using the stability analysis of replicating dynamic equations and Jacobian matrices, explores the stability of various equilibrium points in the game model. Finally, the conclusion is drawn that the equilibrium point (0,0,1) and equilibrium point (1,0,0) are asymptotically stable, thereby solving the prisoner’s dilemma.

关 键 词：间接互惠 辨别者策略 囚徒博弈 演化稳定性 

分 类 号：G63[文化科学—教育学]