浅谈费希特哲学相对于康德哲学的部分进步性——从“物自体”与“非我”的对比说起  

Discussion on the Progress of Fichte’s Philosophy Compared with Kant’s —From the Comparison between “Thing Itself” and “Not-I”

作　　者：董思涵 

机构地区：[1]北京大学哲学系,北京

出　　处：《哲学进展》2023年第3期555-562,共8页Advances in Philosophy

摘　　要：为调和“经验论”与“唯理论”的矛盾,康德借鉴唯理论将知识合法性的判决性要素转移到先验自我之中,同时提出“物自体”解释感性直观的来源和人类认知的局限。费希特则在对康德哲学做一元化处理的过程中鲜明指出了主体哲学的新进路。“非我”是费希特知识学三条基本原理的构成部分,在费希特建立稳固严密的一元知识论体系的过程中具有基础性作用。笔者将简要介绍“物自体”和“非我”的概念并做比较,并在这两个概念设置的层面上探究费希特哲学相对于康德哲学的部分进步性。In order to reconcile the contradiction between “empiricism” and “rationalism”, Kant drew lessons from rationalism to transfer the judgmental properties of the legitimacy of knowledge to the a priori self, and at the same time proposed “thing itself” to explain the origin of perceptual intuition and the limits of human cognition. Fichte united the theoretical and practical sections of Kant’s philosophy, and in the process of monolithic treatment of Kant’s philosophy, he pointed out a new path for subject philosophy. The “not-I” is a component of the three basic principles of Fichte’s epistemology, which plays a fundamental role in the process of establishing a solid and rigorous monistic system of knowledge. The author will briefly introduce and compare the concepts of "thing itself" and “not-I”, and then explore the progress of Fichte’s philosophical theories compared with Kant’s according to these two conceptual settings.

关 键 词：物自体 非我 康德 费希特 

分 类 号：B51[哲学宗教—外国哲学]