“黄”与“马”的界限——重思乔治·摩尔的“简单事物”概念  

The Boundary between “Yellow” and “Horse”—Rethinking G. E. Moore’s Concept of “Simple Notion”

作　　者：龚建伟 

机构地区：[1]苏州科技大学马克思主义学院,江苏 苏州 [2]北京师范大学–香港浸会大学联合国际学院,广东 珠海

出　　处：《哲学进展》2023年第3期589-595,共7页Advances in Philosophy

摘　　要：乔治·摩尔在《伦理学原理》中认为“善”与“黄”都是“简单事物”,但是他关于“简单事物”的讨论不够清晰。通过分析,可以发现“黄”并不仅仅是简单的客体,其在实质上仍然是复杂的客体。而在观念当中,“黄”和“马”一样都可以是简单的概念,因为在摩尔的直觉主义认识论中,这两者都具有独特性,因而“只能是他自身”。如果否认马在观念中可以是简单概念,则对马的定义会陷入循环论证当中。摩尔在《伦理学原理》中还提及了一个奇美拉的例子,但这个例子并不能够自圆其说,摩尔实际上回避了奇美拉的独特性问题,因此不能证明其观点。G. E. Moore believes that “good” and “yellow” are “simple notion” in his book Principia Ethica, but his discussion on “simple notion” is not clear enough. Through analysis, we can find that “yellow” is not only a simple object but also a complex object objectively. In human thought, “yellow” and “horse” can both be simple concepts because, in Moore’s intuitionistic epistemology, both have unique characteristics. If we deny that the horse can be a simple concept in concept, the definition of the horse will fall into the circle of argument. Moore also mentioned an example of Chimera in Principia Ethica, but this example also has defects. Moore avoided the uniqueness of Chimera, so this is not a good example.

关 键 词：乔治·摩尔 《伦理学原理》 善 简单事物 不可定义 

分 类 号：G63[文化科学—教育学]