浅析柏拉图知识论中关于感觉的驳斥——以《泰阿泰德》为例  

A Brief Analysis of the Refutation of Sensation in Plato’s Theory of Knowledge—Taking Theaetetus as an Example

作　　者：唐睿 

机构地区：[1]贵阳学院阳明学与黔学研究院,贵州 贵阳

出　　处：《哲学进展》2023年第8期1547-1551,共5页Advances in Philosophy

摘　　要：关于知识是什么的问题,柏拉图借苏格拉底之口提出的第一个定义便是“知识是感觉”。苏格拉底通过归谬论证的方式,从“人是万物的尺度”出发,一步步论证,以知识是感觉,知识总是存在的东西为前提,但最终却得到睁眼可以得到知识,闭眼就失去知识的错误结论,避免不了感觉的流变与知识的存真的两难境地,因而得出的结论为假,所设立的前提也会被推翻。On the question of what knowledge is, the first definition put forward by Plato through the mouth of Socrates is “Knowledge is awareness”. Socrates demonstrated step by step by way of fallacy proof, starting from “man is the measure of all things” and taking knowledge as the premise that knowledge is a feeling and knowledge always exists, but finally came to the wrong conclusion that knowledge can be obtained when one opens one’s eyes, while knowledge is lost when one closes his eyes. He could not avoid the dilemma between the flow of sensation and the existence of knowledge, so the conclusion he drew was false. The premise will be overturned.

关 键 词：《泰阿泰德》 知识 感觉 柏拉图 是 

分 类 号：G63[文化科学—教育学]