论贝克莱对“抽象观念”的批驳——《人类知识原理》绪论的结构与意义  

On Berkeley’s Refutation of “Abstract Idea”—The Structure and Significance of the Introduction to Principles of Human Knowledge

作　　者：代知行 

机构地区：[1]北京十一实验中学,北京

出　　处：《哲学进展》2024年第6期1336-1345,共10页Advances in Philosophy

摘　　要：贝克莱所谓的观念即是那种现象与本质绝对同一,可以把它理解为一种特殊的存在。而抽象作用则是在特殊当中取得一般的过程,对“抽象观念”的批驳实质上就是对把一般存在当作特殊存在来看待的批驳。对“抽象观念”的批驳为《人类知识原理》提供了论述方法,同时也是反驳物质存在的重要基础。Berkeley’s so-called idea is that the phenomenon and the essence are absolutely the same, it can be understood as a special existence. The abstraction is the process of obtaining the general in the special process, and the refutation of the “abstract idea” is in essence to the refutation of the general existence as a special existence. The criticism of the “abstract idea” provides a discussion method for the Principles of Human Knowledge, and is also an important basis for refuting the existence of matter.

关 键 词：《人类知识原理》 贝克莱 观念 抽象观念 

分 类 号：G63[文化科学—教育学]