蒯因自然主义认识论探析  

An Analysis of Quine’s Naturalistic Epistemology

作　　者：罗莹玲 

机构地区：[1]广西大学马克思主义学院,广西 南宁

出　　处：《哲学进展》2024年第9期2422-2430,共9页Advances in Philosophy

摘　　要：蒯因将哲学视为科学的延伸部分,认为哲学研究对象均要依赖科学研究对象。蒯因哲学的核心要义即哲学科学化,他不再将经验主义看作是凌驾于科学之上的哲学原理,而是一条毋庸置疑、内在于科学的科学原理。蒯因认为,感官刺激能为科学理论的建立提供唯一及最终支撑,故而认识论研究应当聚焦于感觉证据对科学理论的支持关系。蒯因将目光放置于认识的实际发生过程,借助科学与哲学的相关性,运用经验科学的手段,走向了自然化认识论。但其自然主义认识论也遭到了普特南、金在权、斯特劳德等人的诘难,他们对蒯因自然主义认识论的规范性与可靠性提出了质疑。Quine regarded philosophy as an extension of science, believing that the objects of philosophical research all rely on scientific research objects. The core essence of Quine’s philosophy is the scientification of philosophy, where he no longer views empiricism as a principle above science, but rather an unquestionable and inherent scientific principle. Quine believes that sensory stimuli can provide the sole and ultimate support for the establishment of scientific theories, so the research of epistemology should focus on the supporting relationship between sensory evidence and scientific theories. Quine placed his gaze on the actual process of cognition, utilizing the correlation between science and philosophy and the means of empirical science to move towards naturalized epistemology. But his naturalistic epistemology was also questioned by Putnam, Jaegwon Kim, Stroud, and others, who questioned the normativity and reliability of Quine’s naturalistic epistemology.

关 键 词：蒯因 自然主义 认识论 

分 类 号：B82[哲学宗教—伦理学]