论拉兹自由的价值  

On the Value of Raz’s Freedom

作　　者：郑珊 

机构地区：[1]贵州大学哲学学院,贵州 贵阳

出　　处：《哲学进展》2024年第9期2473-2477,共5页Advances in Philosophy

摘　　要：在《自由的道德》一书中,面临修正主义者对自由是否具有价值的怀疑的挑战,拉兹从自由的预设和简单原则两个思路对自由的价值进行证成,认为自由不仅具有工具价值,还具有内在价值。自由价值的重构需要深思个人自主问题,自由价值的证成为拉兹自由主义至善论的进路奠定了一定的基础作用。In The Morality of Freedom, faced with the challenge of the revisionists’ skepticism about whether freedom has value, Raz evidences the value of freedom from two lines of thought, namely, the presupposition of freedom and the principle of simplicity, and argues that freedom has not only instrumental value, but also intrinsic value. The reconstruction of the value of freedom requires a deep reflection on the question of personal autonomy, and the justification of the value of freedom provides a certain fundamental role for the way forward of Raz’s theory of the Supreme Good.

关 键 词：自由价值 自主 至善论 

分 类 号：G63[文化科学—教育学]