笛卡尔普遍怀疑方法探析  

Analysis of Descartes’s Universal Skepticism Method

作　　者：王凯[1] 

机构地区：[1]延安大学政法与公共管理学院,陕西 延安

出　　处：《哲学进展》2024年第10期2496-2504,共9页Advances in Philosophy

摘　　要：受古代怀疑论者和中世纪唯名论思潮的影响,为了对抗其消极怀疑论和对理性的不信任,笛卡尔提出普遍怀疑方法,虽然该方法由怀疑人到怀疑上帝、由怀疑感觉经验知识到怀疑具体科学知识破坏了人类的知识大厦,但是笛卡尔建设性地找到一个“阿基米德点”——“我在怀疑”不可怀疑,从而确立基础主义的第一原则、高扬理性权威、弥补“直观”缺陷且对胡塞尔现象学创立大有裨益。不过,普遍怀疑方法中存在的诸如与自身真理观相矛盾和“我思”原则不具有普遍适用性的问题应引起足够重视。Influenced by ancient skeptics and medieval nominalism, and in order to counter their negative skepticism and distrust of reason, Descartes proposed the method of universal skepticism, although this method destroyed the edifice of human knowledge from doubting man to doubting God, from doubting sensory empirical knowledge to doubting concrete scientific knowledge. But Descartes constructively found an “Archimedes point”—“I am doubting” cannot be doubted, thus establishing the first principle of foundationalism, exalting the authority of reason, making up for the defects of “intuition” and contributing greatly to the establishment of Husserl’s phenomenology. However, the problems existing in the general doubt method, such as the contradiction with their own view of truth and the principle of “cogito” is not universally applicable, should be paid enough attention.

关 键 词：唯名论思潮 笛卡尔普遍怀疑方法 基础主义 胡塞尔现象学 

分 类 号：G63[文化科学—教育学]