斯派洛与图灵分类测试:人工智能道德观念的交锋与启示  

Sparrow and the Turing Triage Test: Exploring the Clash of Moral Perspectives in Artificial Intelligence and Its Implications

作　　者：翁新旭 翁磊 

机构地区：[1]同济大学人文学院,上海 [2]布宜诺斯艾利斯大学法学院,阿根廷 布宜诺斯艾利斯 [3]瓯麓科技服务(浙江)有限公司,浙江 温州

出　　处：《哲学进展》2024年第11期2999-3004,共6页Advances in Philosophy

摘　　要：最新的GPT系列产品,让人们更加憧憬认知能力远远超过人类的通用AI。与此同时,一些伦理学家认为应该赋予人工智能以道德地位,让它们能为自己的行为负责。斯派洛通过构造“图灵分类测试”的思想实验反对以普特南为代表的计算功能主义的观点,同时也反对构建道德机器。他认为AI缺乏本体论意义上“内在生命”,也不具有惩罚的可能性,从而也不具备道德地位。但是,在斯派洛的思想实验中,并没有严格区分“道德能动者”和“道德承受者”,以致于在斯派洛的论证中,对AI道德地位的界定是模糊的。尽管如此,斯派洛的思想实验仍具有启发性意义。The latest GPT series products make people more hopeful about general AI whose cognitive ability far exceeds that of humans. At the same time, some ethicists argue that AI should be given moral status, holding them responsible for their actions. Sparrow opposed Putnam’s view of computational functionalism through his thought experiment of constructing the Turing triage test, as well as the construction of a moral machine. He argues that AI lacks an “inner life” in an ontological sense, has no “potential for punishment,” and thus has no moral standing. However, in Sparrow’s thought experiment, there is no strict distinction between “moral agent” and “moral patient”, so that in Sparrow’s argument, the definition of AI’s moral status is vague. Still, Sparrow’s thought experiment is instructive.

关 键 词：格图灵分类测试 斯派洛 功能主义 内在生命 

分 类 号：G63[文化科学—教育学]