高管激励、过度投资与成本粘性关系实证研究  

An Empirical Study on the Relationship between Executive Incentive, Over Investment and Cost Stickiness

作　　者：张玲[1] 张晓敏[1] 

机构地区：[1]河北农业大学,河北 保定

出　　处：《国际会计前沿》2021年第4期105-115,共11页Frontiers of International Accounting

摘　　要：本文研究范围为2013~2017年沪深两市A股制造业上市公司,通过激励方式不同,将高管激励区分为显性激励与隐性激励,分别探索其对成本粘性的影响。结果显示,股权激励的实施可以抑制高管过度投资行为,进而弱化企业成本粘性;而在职消费作为一种隐性激励会刺激高管做出过度投资决策,反而会增加企业成本粘性程度。本文的发现丰富了高管激励对成本粘性影响的研究成果,也证实了过度投资在其中发挥的中介作用。The research scope of this paper isthe A-share Manufacturing Listed Companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2013to 2017. Through different incentive methods, the executive incentive isdivided into explicit incentive and implicit incentive, and its impact on CostStickiness is explored respectively. The results show that the implementationof equity incentive can inhibit executives’ over investment behavior and weakenthe Cost Stickiness of enterprises;as an implicit incentive, on-the-jobconsumption will stimulate executives to make over investment decisions, butwill increase the Cost Stickiness of enterprises. The findings of this paperenrich the research results of the impact of executive incentive on coststickiness, and also confirm the intermediary role of over investment.

关 键 词：显性激励 隐性激励 过度投资 成本粘性 

分 类 号：F27[经济管理—企业管理]