环境治理中地方政府与排污企业的博弈及对策分析——基于中央政府干预的视角  

Analysis of the Game and Countermeasures between Local Governments and Pollutant Discharge Enterprises in Environmental Governance—Based on the Perspective of Central Government Intervention

作　　者：夏侯佐源 李师煜[1] 邬晨雨 吕祎伟 

机构地区：[1]江西理工大学理学院,江西 赣州

出　　处：《低碳经济》2021年第3期51-58,共8页Journal of Low Carbon Economy

摘　　要：中国特色社会主义迈入新时代,推动环境治理,建设“美丽中国”仍任重道远。本文运用博弈论,分析了中国式分权背景下地方政府与排污企业关于环境治理的博弈机制,认为二者具有“共谋”的倾向。在此基础上引入中央政府的干预作用,建立了中央政府干预前后地方政府与排污企业博弈机制变化的对照研究。研究表明中央政府的干预对打破地方政府与排污企业“共谋”行为起着决定性作用,能够有效提高社会环境效益。并根据研究结果对中央政府提出环境治理中央集权、细化传统政绩评价体系、完善环境治理监察体系等建议。Socialism with Chinese characteristics has entered a new era;promoting environmental governance and building a “beautiful China” still has a long way to go. This article uses game theory to analyze the game mechanism of environmental governance between local governments and pollutant com-panies under the background of Chinese-style decentralization, and believes that the two have a tendency to “collusion”. On this basis, the intervention of the central government was introduced, and a comparative study of the changes in the game mechanism between local governments and pollutant emission companies before and after the intervention of the central government was es-tablished. Studies have shown that the intervention of the central government plays a decisive role in breaking the “collusion” behavior of local governments and pollutant emission companies, and can effectively improve social environmental benefits. Based on the results of the research, sugges-tions were made to the central government on environmental governance centralization, refine-ment of the traditional performance evaluation system, and improvement of the environmental governance supervision system.

关 键 词：环境治理 政企共谋 博弈分析 对照探究 

分 类 号：F27[经济管理—企业管理]