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机构地区:[1]天津农学院经济管理学院,天津
出 处:《现代管理》2024年第3期487-497,共11页Modern Management
摘 要:本文基于演化博弈和价值共创理论,针对生鲜农产品供应链成员是否合作投入保鲜努力构建演化博弈模型,并引入惩罚机制,探究不同影响因素作用条件下供应链价值共创的演化结果。研究表明,只有当选择合作投入保鲜努力所获利润均高于其搭便车利润时,供应链成员才有可能都选择“投入保鲜努力”策略,实现价值共创。在价值共创过程中,应通过设置合理收益分配和成本分担机制、适当的奖惩机制等措施来促进合作,提升生鲜农产品供应链价值共创水平。Based on the theory of evolutionary game and value co-creation, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model aiming at whether the members of fresh agricultural products supply chain cooperate in freshness-keeping effort, and introduces the punishment mechanism to explore the evolutionary results of value co-creation under different influence factors. The study shows that only when the profits of choosing cooperation to invest in freshness-keeping efforts are higher than those of free hiking, can the members of the supply chain all choose the strategy of “investing in freshness-keeping efforts” to realize value co-creation. In the process of value co-creation, these measures should be put up to promote cooperation in order to enhance the level of value co-creation of fresh agricultural products supply chain including reasonable income distribution and cost sharing mechanism, and appropriate reward and punishment mechanism.
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