信息不透明的供应链主体间利益分享策略研究  

Research on Benefit Sharing Strategies among Supply Chain Entities with Unclear Information

作　　者：冉文学[1] 罗娜 

机构地区：[1]云南财经大学物流与管理工程学院,云南 昆明

出　　处：《现代管理》2024年第10期2692-2704,共13页Modern Management

摘　　要：市场经济背景中,供应链的上下游之间的关系是需求决定供给,本文构建了一个在订单生产模式下,由供应商和零售商组成的供应链系统,以供应商返利为切入点,通过构建Stackelberg博奕模型,针对信息不透明、零售商信息共享和供应商信息预测能力三种不同情形,进行了深入分析并得出博弈均衡解,基于此解运用数值分析和敏感性分析得出供应商返利策略的影响结论。In the context of a market economy, the relationship between the upstream and downstream of the supply chain is that demand determines supply. This article constructs a supply chain system consisting of suppliers and retailers in the order production mode, with supplier rebates as the entry point. By constructing a Stackelberg game model, an in-depth analysis is conducted for three different situations: information asymmetry, retailer information sharing, and supplier information prediction ability, and a game equilibrium solution is obtained. Based on this solution, numerical analysis and sensitivity analysis are used to draw conclusions on the impact of supplier rebate strategies.

关 键 词：信息不透明 供应链主体 供应商让利 利益分享 

分 类 号：F27[经济管理—企业管理]