考虑回收努力和信号博弈的EOL产品回收供应链均衡策略研究  

Research on the Equilibrium Strategy of EOL Product Recycling Supply Chain Considering Recycling Efforts and Signal Game

作　　者：杨家兴 鞠凯强 徐超 

机构地区：[1]江西理工大学经济管理学院,江西 赣州

出　　处：《管理科学与工程》2025年第1期324-330,共7页Management Science and Engineering

摘　　要：构建由制造商、回收商组成的二级供应链博弈模型。考虑EOL产品回收市场信息不对称,讨论制造商是否进行自主回收和付出回收努力,对制造商建立自主回收渠道和不建立自主回收渠道两种不同情形下的供应链成员最优决策展开研究。研究结果表明,当制造商建立自主回收渠道时,H型回收商可以通过设置最优回收量来实现利润最大化,L型回收商的最优回收量则会受制造商回收价格的影响而出现差异。Construct a two-level supply chain game model composed of manufacturers and recyclers. Considering the information asymmetry of EOL product recycling market, this paper discusses whether manufacturers carry out independent recycling and makes recycling efforts, and studies the optimal decision-making of supply chain members under two different situations: The results show that when manufacturers establish independent recycling channels, H-type recyclers can maximize profits by setting the optimal recycling amount, while the optimal recycling volume of L-shaped recyclers will be affected by the manufacturer’s recycling price.

关 键 词：信号博弈 逆向供应链 供应链决策 信息不对称 

分 类 号：F27[经济管理—企业管理]