医联体内核心医院与成员医院合作策略分析——基于博弈论与激励相容理论  

Analysis on the Cooperation Strategy between the Core Hospital and Member Hospitals in the Medical Alliance—Based on Game Theory and Incentive Compatibility Theory

作　　者：王璞 阎瑞霞[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海工程技术大学管理学院,上海

出　　处：《运筹与模糊学》2022年第3期724-729,共6页Operations Research and Fuzziology

摘　　要：医联体内核心医院与成员医院的合作行为,影响医疗资源的优化配置和医联体的协调发展。以博弈理论为基础,构建核心医院和成员医院的博弈模型,以双方是否积极合作为博弈点分析其策略选择。针对存在问题,结合激励相容原理,提出对策建议:政府主导,加大财政支持;核心医院明确定位,适当放权;提升成员医院实力,推进医联体发展。The cooperative behavior of the core hospital and member hospitals in the medical alliance affects the optimal allocation of medical resources and the coordinated development of the medical alliance. Based on the game theory, the game model of the core hospital and the member hospital is constructed, and the strategic choice is analyzed based on whether the two sides actively cooperate as the game point. In view of the existing problems, combined with the principle of incentive compatibility, put forward countermeasures and suggestions: the government should lead and increase financial support;core hospitals have a clear positioning and appropriate decentralization;enhance the strength of member hospitals and promote the development of medical alliances.

关 键 词：医疗联合体 博弈论 激励相容 

分 类 号：F27[经济管理—企业管理]