高管纵向兼任对企业费用粘性的影响研究  

Research on the Impact of Longitudinal Executive Confinement on Corporate Expense Stickiness

作　　者：张悦[1] 张磊[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海工程技术大学管理学院,上海

出　　处：《运筹与模糊学》2023年第3期1478-1492,共15页Operations Research and Fuzziology

摘　　要：我国高管兼任现象普遍存在于现代企业中,目前学术界关于高管纵向兼任为企业带来的影响褒贬不一。本章将以2015~2021年全部A股上市公司为研究对象,基于目前学术界对高管纵向兼任的两种理论:“侵占效应”理论与“掏空效应”理论,从实证的角度论证高管纵向兼任对企业费用粘性的最终影响。实证结果发现:在公司治理过程中高管纵向兼任带给企业的“侵占效应”强于“监督效应”,从而使得高管纵向兼任的存在加剧了企业内部的费用粘性水平。通过本文不仅研究丰富了关于高管纵向兼任的研究成果,而且为优化企业公司治理机制提供一定的建议。The phenomenon of concurrently serving as senior executives in China is common in modern enterprises, and the current academic circles have mixed reviews on the impact of vertical conjunctive tenure on enterprises. This chapter will take all A-share listed companies from 2015 to 2021 as the research object, and demonstrate the ultimate impact of vertical executive conjugation on the stickiness of enterprise expenses from an empirical perspective based on two theories of the current academic circle: the theory of “encroachment effect” and the theory of “hollowing out effect”. The empirical results show that in the process of corporate governance, the “encroachment effect” of vertical contemporaneity of senior executives is stronger than the “supervision effect”, so that the existence of long-term contemporaneity of senior executives aggravates the level of internal cost stickiness. This paper not only enriches the research results on the vertical concurrent role of executives, but also provides some suggestions for optimizing the corporate governance mechanism of enterprises.

关 键 词：高管纵向兼任 企业费用粘性 侵占效应 监督效应 

分 类 号：F27[经济管理—企业管理]