基于演化博弈的移动支付平台参与低碳创新及其稳定性研究  

Study on the Participation of Mobile Payment Platform in Low-Carbon Innovation and Its Stability Based on Evolutionary Game

作　　者：黄娜 蒋琬珺 

机构地区：[1]上海工程技术大学管理学院,上海

出　　处：《运筹与模糊学》2023年第5期4428-4437,共10页Operations Research and Fuzziology

摘　　要：基于当前可持续发展需求以及移动支付的大范围普及和多方渗透,移动支付平台开展低碳创新显得尤为迫切,通过对我国30省市碳排放格局进行刻画,得到不同地区的碳排放分布情况,根据不同分布格局对应调整移动支付业务特点,注重政府组织在此过程中的参与。其次结合碳排放分布格局,通过演化博弈构造博弈模型并分析移动支付平台低碳创新中政府组织与移动支付平台方的协作关系,博弈双方的策略稳定性与双方合作的投入成本成反比,与协同收益、收益分配比例在一定范围内正相关,探究了其协作过程中的相互作用关系和稳定点,给后续的进一步协作发展与移动支付转型绿色支付,促进减排降碳提供参考。Based on the current demand for sustainable development and the widespread popularization and multi-party penetration of mobile payment, it is particularly urgent for mobile payment platforms to carry out low-carbon innovation. By portraying the carbon emission pattern of 30 provinces and cities in China, we obtain the distribution of carbon emission in different regions, adjust the characteristics of the mobile payment business according to the different distribution patterns, and pay attention to the participation of the governmental organizations in this process. Secondly, in combination with the carbon emission distribution pattern, the game model is constructed through evolutionary gaming and analyzes the collaborative relationship between governmental organisations and mobile payment platforms in the low-carbon innovation of mo-bile payment platforms. The strategic stability of the two parties is inversely proportional to the input cost of their collaboration, and positively correlated with the synergistic benefit and benefit distribution ratio within a certain range. The interactions and stability points in the collaborative process are explored to provide reference for further collaborative development and transformation of mobile payment into green payment to promote carbon reduction.

关 键 词：低碳创新 移动支付平台 博弈 碳排放 

分 类 号：G63[文化科学—教育学]