公司章程反收购条款设置与管理层超额薪酬  

Anti-takeover Provisions and Executive Excess Compensation: Evidence from China

作　　者：胡志颖[1] 童梦露 梁上坤[2] Hu Zhiying

机构地区：[1]北京科技大学经济管理学院,100083 [2]中央财经大学会计学院,100081

出　　处：《会计研究》2022年第4期140-155,共16页Accounting Research

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学一般项目(19YJA790032);财政部高端会计人才(学术类)培养项目的支持

摘　　要：本文选取2009-2017年上市A股公司作为研究样本,探究章程反收购条款对管理层超额薪酬的影响,得到如下结论:在我国当前环境下,反收购条款设置增加了管理层超额薪酬的获取。进一步研究还发现:(1)延迟类反收购条款对管理层超额薪酬的作用更强。(2)在管理层权力高、独立董事占比小以及管理层短视化程度高的公司中,反收购条款对管理层超额薪酬的作用更明显。(3)反收购条款对超额薪酬的作用在国有企业中更不显著;(4)股权结构对反收购条款和超额薪酬之间的影响呈现非线性关系。(5)反收购条款的设置降低了公司的价值,尤其是在更高超额薪酬的公司。本文丰富了章程反收购条款和管理层薪酬领域的研究,对完善公司治理具有重要的意义。This article examines the effect of anti-takeover provisions on executive excess compensation and find a positive association.Five further findings are as follows.First,among specific provisions,the anti-takeover provisions mainly used to delay the takeover process have a stronger effect on executive excess compensation.Second,the positive effect of anti-takeover provisions on excess compensation is more significant in firms with higher executive power,less independent boards,and higher managerial myopia.Third,anti-takeover provisions have less effect on executive excess compensation in state-owned enterprises compared with non-state-owned enterprises.Fourth,the impact of the ownership structure on the anti-takeover provisions and excess compensation is non-linear.Fifth,the anti-takeover provisions decrease firm value,especially in those firms with more executive excess compensation.This article complements the literature on the anti-takeover provisions and executive compensation,which has great significance for the improvement of corporate governance.

关 键 词：章程反收购条款 超额薪酬 股权分散 产权性质 公司价值 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理] F272.92[经济管理—国民经济]