基于能力和相对业绩比较的经营者激励机制研究  

Research on Incentive Mechanism of Executives Based on Ability and Relative Performance Evaluation

作　　者：徐延利[1] 

机构地区：[1]哈尔滨师范大学管理学院,黑龙江哈尔滨150025

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2008年第S1期41-44,共4页Chinese Journal of Management Science

摘　　要：如何激励企业的经营者为股东的最大利益而努力,是现代企业面临的重要课题。为进一步解决经营者的激励机制问题,本文采用数学分析的方法,在不对称信息条件下经营者激励机制的设计中同时考虑了经营者能力和相对业绩比较等因素,使得经营者激励机制的设计更加完善、更加全面。分析结果表明:经营者的经营能力、努力成本、相对业绩比较、风险厌恶程度等,影响经营者的激励合约。This paper analyses the optimal incentive contracts between stockholders and executives under asymmetric information condition through mathematical analytic methods with ability and relative performance evaluation considered. The results show that the incentive contracts of the executives are affected by the abilities,effort costs,relative performance evaluation,risk aversion degree of the executives.

关 键 词：激励机制 能力 相对业绩比较 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理] F224[经济管理—国民经济]