基于超产权论的企业治理机制分析  

Analysis of Corporate Governance Mechanism Based on Beyond Property-right Theory

作　　者：李雁南[1] 方天堃[2] 

机构地区：[1]沈阳农业大学经济管理学院,沈阳110161 [2]沈阳航空工业学院经济管理学院,沈阳110136

出　　处：《管理学家（学术版）》2008年第4期365-372,403,共9页

摘　　要：本文借助于超产权论所提供的分析框架及相关的实证研究结果,从竞争的角度对影响企业绩效的基本治理机制进行了系统化的分析。研究表明:首先,企业内部各方面治理机制难以同时达到最优状态,它们对产权分配的要求是矛盾的;其次,评判企业内部治理机制所发挥的功能是否有效取决于对竞争环境的适应,抛开对竞争的考察,将无法决定企业内部影响治理机制的各要素(例如股权集中度情况)应处于何种状态才是最佳。最后,为企业治理机制的完善提出对策建议。The author makes a systematic analysis on basic governance mechanism that affects corporate performance from the aspect of competition.The research is based on the analysis framework provided by beyond property-right theory and relative research results.The research shows,firstly,it is hard for every respect in corporate governance mechanism to reach the best condition simultaneously.Their demand is contradictory in the allocation of property rights.Secondly,in order to evaluate an internal governance mechanism the researcher must find out whether it well adapts to competition.It is impossible to judge when corporate internal elements that affects governance mechanism reach their best,such as ownership concentration,without a study on competition.At last, the author makes some suggestions to improve the corporate governance mechanism.

关 键 词：超产权论 竞争 企业治理机制 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]