投资者异质信念、股权融资现金流与企业过度投资--来自中国A股的经验证据  

Investors' Heterogeneous Beliefs,Equity Cash Flow and Overinvestment:Evidence from Chinese A-stock Market

作　　者：许致维[1,2] 李少育[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学证券与期货学院,四川成都611130 [2]美国德州农工大学经济系,美国德克萨斯州大学城77840

出　　处：《财经研究》2014年第7期86-96,共11页Journal of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目(71301131);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目(JBK131119、JBK140953)

摘　　要：文章在限制卖空的背景下,利用改进的股权融资模型和投资者迎合理论模型,理论分析并实证检验了投资者异质信念与企业过度投资行为之间的关系。研究表明:投资者异质信念既通过促使企业管理者迎合投资者而直接加剧企业过度投资,也通过影响企业的股权融资现金流而间接促进其过度投资;投资者异质信念对私营企业过度投资的影响仅体现在投资者迎合渠道,而对国有企业的影响则主要反映在股权融资渠道;两种作用渠道都存在于成长性企业中,而不存在于非成长性企业中。In the background of short selling restrictions,this paper theoretically analyzes and empirically tests the relationship between investors' heterogeneous beliefs and overinvestment by improved equity financing and investor-catering models.It comes to the following results:firstly,investors' heterogeneous beliefs directly intensify overinvestment by the investor catering channel,and indirectly advance overinvestment by the effect on corporate equity cash flow;secondly,only the investor catering channel embodies the effect of investors' heterogeneous beliefs on overinvestment in private firms and as for state-owned firms,the equity financing channel mainly embodies the effect;thirdly,these two channels coexist in growth firms,but not in non-growth firms.

关 键 词：异质信念 股权融资渠道 投资者迎合渠道 过度投资 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济] F224