荀子思想中的美德  

Virtues in Hsun Tzu's Thought

作　　者：乔纳森W.斯科弗 陈光连[2] 

机构地区：[1]斯坦福大学宗教学系 [2]金陵科技学院思政部,副教授211169

出　　处：《江苏社会科学》2014年第4期243-252,共10页Jiangsu Social Sciences

基　　金：2013教育部人文社科课题:"荀子公正观研究"的阶段性研究成果

摘　　要：荀子思想中的人如何获得德性的观点明显不是现代比较伦理学的发现模式。他确实提供了一个关于人性的概念,在他的思想构架里,从某种意义上说,"真我"是可能的;但是,他的目标是改变那种本性,而不是进而与它产生联系。荀子一般用"德"指代一个有着很高道德发展等级的人的状态或力量。因此,"德"类似于"尧的行动展现了德性"中的"德性"的含义。荀子不使用术语指代特定的美德,所以"德"不类似于"怜悯是一种德性"中的"德性"的含义。荀子相对的在大多数学习的过程中,对恰当动力关注的缺失,挑战了现代用术语定义为不恰当动力的,对德性伪装的关注。荀子观点的考虑引导我们拓展了获得德性发展模式的构造,也引导我们在理解之后质疑德性伪装的重要性。According to the discovering model, virtues are gained by getting access to or understanding true self. Human beings, therefore, discover a self in real nature. The idea how humans gain virtues in Husn Tzu's thought is definitely not the discovering model. Instead, he offered a concept on human nature. In his ideology, in a sense, true self is possible; however, his goal is to change the nature instead of relating to it. Hsun Tzu referred to 'virtue' as a state of a person with high moral development or the strength such a person has. The reflection on Hsun Tzu's conception helps us expand the structure of developmental model of gaining virtues and question the importance of virtue disguise.

关 键 词：荀子 德性 人性 比较伦理学 

分 类 号：B222.6[哲学宗教—中国哲学]