“怵惕之心”何以不是“仁之端”——孟子同情理论的内在逻辑  

Why “apprehensiveness” is not “the beginning of benevolence” ——the inner logic of Mencius' s sympathy theory

作　　者：陆畅[1] 

机构地区：[1]苏州科技学院教育与公共管理学院,江苏苏州215009

出　　处：《中南大学学报（社会科学版）》2014年第6期34-39,共6页Journal of Central South University：Social Sciences

基　　金：2011年度国家社科基金一般项目"儒教的传统形态与现代转型研究"(11BZJ038);江苏省高校哲学社会科学重点研究基地"南京大学儒佛道与中国传统文化研究中心"重大项目"儒学概念;问题与价值综合研究"(2010JDXM008)

摘　　要：孟子在阐述同情理论时说"人皆有怵惕恻隐之心",但在归纳"仁之端"时只说"恻隐之心,仁之端也",并未将"怵惕"算上,这是有深意的。怵惕恐惧、怀生畏死,是主体以自身的主观构境设身处地想象他者痛苦并产生同情恻隐之情的前提,是刺激良知并使其呈露的必要条件。"圣人"虽然"不动心",不为痛苦困扰,但对他者的同情依然要建立在对死亡的恐惧与担忧之上,只是这种恐惧怵惕是对全体生命之有限性的觉察与悲悯,是为他者害怕与担忧。Mencius said in his sympathy theory, “everyone has apprehensiveness and sympathy”, but apprehensiveness doesn’t mean the beginning of benevolence, which is profound meaning. Apprehensiveness, with fear of death is the premise of sympathy and compassion that means subject should place himself in others’ position to imagine other painful experience. It is also the necessary condition to stimulate and present Liangzhi. Although Saints are not tempted by other things and plagued by pain, the sympathy for others should be built on the apprehensiveness and fear of death, which is the awareness and compassion on the finiteness for all life and the fear and worry for others.

关 键 词：孟子 同情理论 内在逻辑 怵惕之心 恻隐之心 意识构境 

分 类 号：B222.5[哲学宗教—中国哲学]