供需链中质量控制策略与个体决策  

Quality contract and individual decisions in supply chains

作　　者：田春华[1] 柴跃廷[1] 刘义[1] 任守榘[1] 

机构地区：[1]清华大学自动化系,北京100084

出　　处：《清华大学学报（自然科学版）》2004年第7期1005-1008,共4页Journal of Tsinghua University(Science and Technology)

基　　金：国家"八六三"高技术项目(2003AA413032;2001AA414230);国家教育振兴计划项目(09110-9001)

摘　　要：为了研究信息对称情形下质量控制策略对供需双方决策的影响,采用Nash博弈模型,分析了事前检查、事后反馈和综合策略下均衡解的单调性、整体费用极小值点的惟一性、集体理性均衡解的特点和均衡机制的性质。结果表明:事前检查策略下,供方产品质量低于理想情形,需方质检力度高于理想情形;事后反馈方式下,产品质量和质检力度都低于理想情形;只有综合策略能达到理想情形。供需双方利益不一致会造成系统在单种策略下不能达到协调。The impact of quality contracts on supply chain behavior with information symmetry was studied using Nash game theory. The analysis studied the monotonity of equilibrium, the uniqueness of minimum solution to the total cost, and the properties of the collective rational equilibrium for three different strategies, pre-appraisement, ex post feedback and comprehensive measurements. The results show that with the pre-appraisement strategy, product quality is lower while the inspection level is higher than the first-best case; while with the ex post feedback strategy, both decisions are lower than those with the first-best case. Only the comprehensive strategy can attain channel coordination. These inefficiencies are ascribed to the disparities between utilities.

关 键 词：企业经济 供需链 质量控制策略 NASH均衡 

分 类 号：F27[经济管理—企业管理]