企业内部激励机制与兼并效应  

Merger effects and the managerial incentive mechanism of firms

作　　者：钟德强[1] 仲伟俊[1] 罗定提[2] 张晓琪[2] 

机构地区：[1]东南大学经济管理学院,江苏南京210096 [2]株洲工学院管理科学与工程研究所,湖南株洲412008

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2004年第4期378-386,共9页Journal of Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70171025);湖南省自然科学基金资助项目(02JJY5017).

摘　　要：在寡头竞争环境下,引入企业内部激励机制激励参数变量,建立了一个替代性产品企业兼并二阶段Cournot竞争博弈模型:第1阶段,兼并后各企业选择基于利润和销售收入内部激励机制的激励参数;在第2阶段,兼并后各企业的决策者根据企业提供的内部激励机制进行产量竞争.分析了兼并对各企业利润、产量与价格带来的影响.证明了(1)企业普遍存在兼并动机,即兼并企业的利润总是增加的;(2)存在一个兼并临界规模,当兼并规模小于临界规模时,兼并对外部企业产生负外部性;当兼并规模超过临界规模时,兼并对外部企业产生正外部性;并对消费者带来与外部企业相反的影响.进一步讨论了兼并企业内部激励机制激励参数的选择问题,证明激励参数受行业利润率、产品替代性程度与兼并规模的影响.In this paper,we analyze merger incentives and merger effects caused by the managerial incentives based on a linear combination of corporate profits and revenues, and establish a two stage game model of endogenous mergers under Cournot competition in an oligopoly industry with substitute products. In the first stage, the owners of the firms select the managers' incentive mechanism, and in the second stage, the managers choose quantities or prices. It is showed that (1) the firms generally have incentive to merger, in other words, mergers are profitable to the players, (2) existing a critical size, mergers are not profitable to other firms out of mergers alliance when the size of the mergers is under the critical one, and are profitable to other firms out of mergers alliance when the size of the mergers is over the critical one, but have a converse effect on the customers. We also study how owner of mergers firm select the optimal managers' incentive, it is showed that the parameter of the optimal incentive is determined by profit ratio, product substitution degree and size of mergers.

关 键 词：兼并 激励机制 兼并效应 COURNOT竞争 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]