“观念权利”在古代中国的缺失——从文化根源的比较视角论私权的产生基础  

作　　者：彭诚信[1] 

机构地区：[1]吉林大学法学院

出　　处：《环球法律评论》2004年第3期331-343,共13页Global Law Review

基　　金："教育部社科基金重点项目 (0 2JA82 0 0 0 3 )";"吉林大学人文社会科学研究精品项目(2 0 03JP0 0 9)"--<主体性与私权制度研究>的阶段性研究成果

摘　　要：本文意在为中国的私权研究寻找切入点。有关财产、契约制度的丰富史料和古人有关“定分止争”的确权思想 ,表明古代中国有发达的财产、契约等“实在权利” ,缺失的是包含人之平等、自由等主体意识的“观念权利”。通过对中、西传统文化根源的比较研究 ,得出人有无自觉主体意识以及法律对主体资格的承认与否是两种文化差异的最显著表现 ,即古代中国以身份和等级观念为根基的“礼治”和“儒教”思想从开始便漠视人的主体性 ,而西方以自然哲学为根基的自然法理论从开始就注意并强调人的主体性。该差异引致了“观念权利”起源于西方而非中国。因此 。The paper tries to find a starting point for the research on private rights in China. Abundant historical materials relating to property and contract and the ancient idea of “to solve disputes by defining property' show that there were advanced “rights in fact' relating to property and contract in ancient China. What cannot be found in ancient China is the “civil rights concept' involving equality and liberty. By studying the Chinese and western cultures, we can conclude that the most prominent differences between the two are whether the individual has the awareness of subject and whether the subject status of the individual is recognized by the law: the system of “the rule by rites' and Confucianism in ancient China were mainly based on identity and notion of hierarchy and always neglected the individual subject whereas the natural law tradition in the West was based on the natural philosophy and emphasized the individual subject. This is perhaps the main reason why “civil rights concept' had originated from the Western but not Chinese society. Therefore, the study of private rights should begin with the study of subjectivity of the individual.

关 键 词：古代 中国 私权 法律文化学 “观念权利” 传统文化 

分 类 号：D909.2[政治法律—法学理论]