制度经济学视角下的刑事悬赏  

Analysis on Criminal Reward from the Perspective of Institutional Economics

作　　者：闫召华[1] 

机构地区：[1]华东政法学院,法学硕士研究生200042

出　　处：《江苏社会科学》2005年第2期117-121,共5页Jiangsu Social Sciences

摘　　要：刑事悬赏是本质上侦查机关私法上的法律行为,行为的目的就是与举报者即刑事悬赏的相对人就犯罪信息进行交易。刑事悬赏是一套预期收益远大于预期成本的有效制度,已在我国的刑事侦查实践中发挥了积极的作用。然而在实施过程中,也出现了不少问题,影响着刑事悬赏的制度绩效。因此,合理确定赏金,明确悬赏的主体和相对人并加强对相对人的权益保护,进一步从交易利益、交易主体、交易安全等方面完善其制度安排已成为刑事悬赏制度创新的必然选择。Criminal reward in nature is a legal behavior by civil law. The purpose of the behavior is to trade information about crime with the informers. Criminal reward can also be regarded as a set of valid system with more expecting benefit than the cost. It has played a significant role in criminal investigation. However, its function is discounted by its disadvantages. So it has become an unavoidable choice for criminal reward to regulate its reward and set up other valid assisting mechanism.

关 键 词：刑事悬赏制度 侦查机关 犯罪信息 赏金 法律行为 私法 刑事侦查 制度经济学 预期成本 交易利益 

分 类 号：D925.2[政治法律—诉讼法学]