经理层持股与上市公司经营绩效相互作用机制研究  

Research on the Reciprocity Mechanism of Managerial Ownership and Firm's Performance

作　　者：杨贺[1] 柯大钢[1] 马春爱[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院,陕西西安710061

出　　处：《河北大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2005年第1期48-51,共4页Journal of Hebei University(Philosophy and Social Science)

摘　　要：不同于以往研究单纯强调经理人员持股对企业绩效的影响,以沪深两市3 70家上市公司为对象,对经理持股与企业绩效的相互作用机制进行了研究。研究表明:我国上市公司不存在持股与企业绩效相互作用的现象,经理持股水平不会对企业绩效产生影响,企业绩效也不是确定经理持股水平的依据;企业规模越大、负债水平越高以及董事长兼任总经理都会带来企业价值的降低,成长能力越强、上市时间越长有利于企业价值的提高;经理持股水平受公司所处行业的影响,而对企业规模、资产结构、自由现金流以及控股股东所有权属性等企业特征变量关注不够。Different from previous study, studies are performed on the reciprocity mechanism of managerial ownership and firm's performance. Taking the data of 370 listed companies, we find that reciprocity doesn't exit between managerial ownership and firm's performance in Chinese listed companies, managerial ownership'level doesn't affect firm's performance and the inverse is true; larger size, and higher debt and the overlap of board chairman and CEO will depress firm's performance, higher growth and the time of being listed are helpful for performance's improvement; the degree of managers' stock is correlated with industry's competition, but it is independent of variables reflecting firm's characters, such as size ,structure of asset, operating margin and the attribute of controlling shareholder.

关 键 词：经理持股 企业价值 上市公司 联立方程 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]