期货经纪公司的最优激励契约模型决策  

Models of Optimal Contract for Motivation for Futures Brokerage Companies

作　　者：刘惠萍[1] 张世英[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理学院,天津300072

出　　处：《工业工程》2005年第3期47-50,共4页Industrial Engineering Journal

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(69874028)

摘　　要：基于委托代理理论,建立了一个激励契约模型,解释了我国期货经纪公司传统的激励机制,并基于长期效用函数建立了一个新的激励契约模型。通过比较,指出现实中所用传统激励契约的不足,建议制定激励契约时既要考虑交易成交量又要考虑客户成长率。Principal-agent theory is employed to establish a model of contract for motivation to discuss traditional motivation mechanism of futures brokerage companies in China. A new model of contract for motivation is set up based on long-term utility function. This paper analyzes disadvantages of traditional contract for motivation. It is concluded that both quantity of futures dealings and growth rate of clients should be taken into consideration when futures brokerage companies drow up contracts for motivation.

关 键 词：模型 最优激励 公司 期货 决策 委托代理 激励机制 效用函数 传统 客户 交易 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理] TN710.02[经济管理—国民经济]