国外反收购对策股东财富效应的影响因素研究  

Foreign Anti-takeover Strategy and Its Impact on Shareholder’s Wealth

作　　者：张本照[1] 杨善林[1] 朱志雄[1] 

机构地区：[1]合肥工业大学

出　　处：《世界经济》2005年第7期69-78,80,共11页The Journal of World Economy

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助;项目编号:01BJL046。

摘　　要：鉴于反收购对策与股价及反收购对策与长期投资之间的经验研究无法解决有关反收购对策究竟是保护还是侵害了公司股东财富的争议,本文试图在更广泛的理论基础上分析反收购对策的影响因素在什么情况下将提高或者侵害公司股东的利益,这些影响因素包括了反收购对策的种类、管理效率和公司内部监督程度(包括董事会监督、股东监督和债权人监督)等。Since the empirical studies of anti-takeover strategies in association with stock prices on the one hand and the long-term investment on the other can not solve the dispute of whether anti-takeover strategies actually protect or reduce the shareholders’value of wealth, this paper attempts to analyze on a broader theoretical basis the varied circumstances in which anti-takeover strategies may increase or impair the interest of shareholders. These influencing factors include a variety of anti-takeover strategies, managerial efficiency and degrees of internal supervision (supervision by the board of directors, shareholders, debtholders, etc.).

关 键 词：反收购 因素研究 财富效应 国外 影响因素 股东财富 经验研究 长期投资 公司股东 理论基础 内部监督 管理效率 股东监督 董事会 债权人 侵害 股价 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理] B841.4[经济管理—国民经济]