串空间代数缺陷到实际攻击的转换  

Converting the Strand Spaces' Algebraic Flaws to Actual Attacks

作　　者：沈海峰[1] 黄河燕[1] 陈肇雄 

机构地区：[1]中国科学技术大学计算机科学系,合肥230026

出　　处：《计算机科学》2005年第7期90-92,98,共4页Computer Science

摘　　要：根据串空间证明协议安全性的代数结论,可以判断协议是否存在缺陷,但没有给出一个精确的答案:究竟攻击是如何进行的?本文提出四条启发式规则以完成代数缺陷到实际攻击的转换。并结合Needham-Schroeder公钥协议、Otway-Rees对称密钥协议进行了攻击转换分析。实践表明这四条规则在把串空间的代数缺陷转换为实际攻击时非常有效。We can conclude whether a protocol is defective according to the algebraic result after proving the protocol's security. But the algebraic result doesn't tell us explicitly how the actual attack takes place. In this paper, we propose four heuristic rules for converting the algebraic result to actual attack, and use them in Needham-Schroed- er public protocol as well as Otway-Rees symmetrical protocol. Practical evidences indicate that these four rules are very efficient in converting Strand Spaces' algebraic flaws to actual attacks.

关 键 词：串空间 攻击 缺陷 代数 启发式规则 密钥协议 REES 安全性 公钥 

分 类 号：TP309[自动化与计算机技术—计算机系统结构] TP393.08[自动化与计算机技术—计算机科学与技术]