Ad Hoc网络中基于Vickrey拍卖的协作激励机制的研究  

Study on Cooperation Incentive Mechanism Based on Vickrey Auction in Ad Hoc Networks

作　　者：王玉峰[1] 王文东[1] 袁刚[1] 程时端[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京邮电大学网络与交换国家重点实验室

出　　处：《北京邮电大学学报》2005年第4期50-53,共4页Journal of Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(9020400360472067);国家"973"项目(2003CB314806)

摘　　要：为了在Adhoc路由策略中提供节点协作的动机并促使节点真实地显示参与Adhoc网络的费用,提出了基于目的地驱动的Vickrey拍卖方式来激励Adhoc网络中节点之间的协作.基于此思想设计的机制利用了经济学中Vickrey拍卖的特点,并显式地考虑了中间节点转发分组的费用.通过从目的地到源路径上中间节点举行的一系列Vickrey拍卖,确定费用最优的路径.理论分析表明,这种机制能激励分组以真实意图竞标,并且在路由选择时实现了全局期望的能量有效的目标.In order to provide incentive to cooperate for nodes in Ad hoc networks, the incentive to cooperate with each other and to motivate those nodes to reveal their cost of participating in network responsibilities, the destination-driven Vickrey auction was designed for the motivation of the cooperation among nodes in Ad hoc networks, which would take advantage of the merit of Vickrey auctions.Meanwhile, the incurred cost of nodes for forwarding packets was taken into account explicitly. The cost-effective path was determined through the series of auctions carried out by intermediate nodes in path from destination to source. Theoretic analysis proves that this mechanism can motivate nodes reveal forwarding cost truthfully, and can achieve the objective of cost efficiency in routing selection.

关 键 词：AD hoe网络 激励机制 Vickrey拍卖 能量有效 

分 类 号：TN929.53[电子电信—通信与信息系统]