董事会对经理控制权监管的博弈分析  

Analysis on Regulating the Manager's Power of Board of Directors in Game Theory

作　　者：于栋[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津大学,天津300072

出　　处：《山东省农业管理干部学院学报》2005年第5期148-149,共2页Journal of Shandong Agricultural Administrators' College

摘　　要：由于企业所有权与实际控制权的分离,控制着企业主要权力并且不受监督的经理可能会以损害股东权益的方式追求他们自身的利益。董事会作为保护股东利益的主要工具,要对职业经理的滥用控制权行为进行监管,在双方的博弈中,纳什均衡是存在的。Because of the separation enterprise's ownership and actual control, manager control enterprise who may pursue interests by way of damaging stockholder's equity is not been supervised. As the main tool protecting the stockholder's interests, board of directors should regulate the behavior of abusing power of the professional manager.

关 键 词：控制权 控制权监管 博弈分析 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]