经理人控制与高级管理人员报酬制定——对实行年薪制上市公司的实证分析  

Managerial Power and Annual Salary's Formulation of Top Management——Empirical research on listed companies of China

作　　者：杨贺[1] 马春爱[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院

出　　处：《经济管理》2005年第18期44-50,共7页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

摘　　要：本文选取连续两年实行年薪制的149家上市公司为样本,对经理人控制与高级管理人员报酬制定之间的关系进行了检验。研究发现,股权结构、董事会治理特征等反映经理控制力的变量不会对高级管理人员年薪产生影响,上一年度的年薪总额却作用明显,在决定是否增减年薪时,公司主要以净资产收益率的变化作为参考标准,独立董事对年薪的不合理变动能起到遏制作用。Whether “managerial power approach” is applicable to the decision-making of operator＇s annual salary in listed companies, taking the data of 149 listed companies in recent two years, the answer is submitted in this paper. It is found that manager＇s power has no effect on operator＇s annual salary, the same is ownership structure, but last year＇s salary is in effect, on the decision whether annual salary should be increased or not, Roe＇s change is often regarded as the main criterion of reference, to an extent, independent director can keep within limits of annual salary＇s irrational change.

关 键 词：高级管理人员年薪 经理人控制 净资产收益率变化 独立董事度 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]