食品供应链安全问题的信号博弈模型  

Game Model of Safety Problem Signaling in Food Supply Chain

作　　者：邓淑芬[1] 吴广谋[1] 赵林度[1] 吴德俊[1] 

机构地区：[1]东南大学系统工程研究所,江苏南京210096

出　　处：《物流技术》2005年第10期135-137,共3页Logistics Technology

基　　金：国家科技攻关计划项目--超市食品安全监控与应急管理信息系统(2001BA804A41);江苏省科技攻关计项目--超市食品安全监控管理信息系统开发(BE2004313);生鲜食品冷藏链体系关键技术研究(BE2004311)资助

摘　　要：基于食品供应链上安全信息不对称的特点以及零售企业运营状况,针对滥用食品安全标签(如无公害、绿色、有机食品标签等)的现象,以食品生产商和消费者作为博弈方,建立信号博弈模型,分析信号博弈的三种贝叶斯均衡及其条件,得出了信息不对称情况下安全食品生产商的损失函数,以及政府控制食品安全的策略。Based on the characteristic of safety information asymmetry in food supply chain as well as the operation condition of retail, and in view of the phenomenon of abuses food safety label （for example does not have environmental damage, green, organic food label and so on）, with taking food producer and the consumer as the game side, the signal game model is established, three kind of Bayesian equilibrium of signal game and the condition are analyzed, in addition , the safety food producer＇s loss function under the information asymmetry is put forward , as well as the strategy of government in food safety.

关 键 词：信号博弈 信息不对称 完美贝叶斯均衡 食品安全 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] F274