经理持股和经营绩效:经理持股激励功能的实证评价  

Management Ownership and Corporate Performance: Cause and Consequence

作　　者：谢军[1] 

机构地区：[1]华南师范大学经济与管理学院,广东广州510631

出　　处：《财经论丛（浙江财经学院学报）》2005年第6期85-90,共6页

基　　金：华南师范大学"211"工程经济学科重点建设子项目;广东省自然科学基金资助项目(5300372)

摘　　要：本文通过实证研究发现,经理持股对公司绩效具有显著的积极影响,即使在控制了经理现金报酬、企业规模和行业属性的影响之后,这种显著性仍然存在,并考察了经理现金报酬、企业规模和行业属性对经理持股的影响程度,结果发现经理持股与经理现金报酬间存在着显著的激励互补效应,经理持股表现出显著性较弱的规模递减效应,但没有观察到行业属性对经理持股的普遍效应,只有信息技术产业类公司具有显著较高的经理持股水平。This paper studies the relation between management shareholding and corporate performance and investigates the incentive effects of management ownership. The result shows that managerial shareholding could positively affect operating performance even after controling management cash compensation, firm size and industry effect. This paper also explores the factors of management ownership and finds that there exists significant supplementary effects between managerial shareholding and managerial cash compensation, and scale decreasing effect of managerial shareholding. There isn＇t significant industry effect.

关 键 词：经理持股 经营绩效 管理激励 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]